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JUSTICE GODFREY ON CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
David D. Gregory*
I. THE WEIGH OF A JUDGE
One of the finest traditions of Anglo-American law is the custom-
ary requirement that judges explain their decisions. Judicial expla-
nations are tellingly called "opinions," for that is exactly what they
are, "opinions" of the individual judge and, when speaking for a ma-
jority, "opinions" of the court. Judicial decisions, however faulty or
sound in result or explanation, are binding on the parties and are
accorded qualities of finality and precedential weight that the opin-
ions of the rest of us can never enjoy. Yet a court's opinions are in
some real sense on a par with our own. We are entitled to examine
judicial opinions with a critical eye (a pastime lawyers and amateurs
quite enjoy) and to decide for ourselves whether the court's results
are soundly based and adequately explained.
The traditional duty of explaining one's decisions in writing must
be a daunting challenge to a judge new at the job, especially one
who has moved from the serene atmosphere of estate planning and
probate to the turbulence of constitutional criminal procedure.
When you have to write it up, you are exposed. Your written opin-
ions are reproduced and disseminated, permanently bound in the
books of the reporters, and nowadays rapidly disbursed to critics
everywhere through the mysteries of data banks and computer net-
works. The difficulties of opinion-writing are all the worse in consti-
tutional criminal procedure, a domain of the United States Supreme
Court in which it hands down grand pronouncements and leaves the
refinements to percolate upward mainly from the state courts until
the Court decides in its discretion to set them straight. Even those
of us who are more or less professional students of judicial decision-
making, finding it hard to keep up with developments, sometimes
secretly wish that the Court would take a breather for a few years to
give us time to figure out where the law stands and where it is going.
State appellate court judges not only have to discern the Supreme
Court's present position and future direction but also simultane-
ously have to decide the multitude of cases being flung fast and furi-
ously at them from below.
Two thoughts stay with me as I read Justice Godfrey's opinions
for the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. First, his opinions contain
meticulously detailed statements of facts. They read as if the writer
* Professor, University of Maine School of Law, B.A., Duke University, LLB.,
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wanted to be sure that readers know all that the records disclosed in
order to be able to judge the validity of the court's analysis. I have
no sense of his sweeping issues or facts under the rug, just the oppo-
site. Second, I noticed the frequency with which his former students
appeared before him. I can easily imagine his pride in having law-
yers whom he had taught debating the issues presented to his court.'
The Godfrey decision I have most frequently cited and relied on
in presenting my own cases on criminal procedure is State v. Bean,2
a decision on the substantive criminal law. Justice Godfrey traced
the statutory history of the crime of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicants and announced the rule that to
commit the crime one "need only operate a motor vehicle within
this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs to
any extent."'3 The significance for constitutional criminal procedure
of that decision and other definitions of crime is a point often over-
looked.' Correctly applying the standards of articulable suspicion
and probable cause validating searches and seizures necessarily de-
pends on the elements of offenses being investigated. The lower the
evidentiary standard for proving an offense, the lower will be the
factual content required for articulable suspicion and probable
cause to believe that the offense has been committed. After State v.
Bean all an officer needs to justify a traffic stop is to be able to state
"specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts,"' support a suspicion of influence on
operation to any degree.
In State v. Thornton6 Justice Godfrey had to decide the validity of
a search warrant challenged on both the requirement of a particular
description of the goods to be seized and the requirement that it be
supported by probable cause. The court upheld the warrant on both
scores and also held that the officers acted within proper bounds in
executing the warrant (to search for drugs in a dormitory room at
the University of Maine in Orono) although "they dismantled furni-
1. Thus Justice Godfrey concurred in State v. Parkinson, 389 A.2d 1, 13 (Me.
1978), to keep the court honest in its statement of the facts known to police officers
and held to constitute probable cause to arrest. The state was represented by Henry
N. Berry, III, District Attorney, Peter G. Ballou, Deputy District Attorney, and Jo-
anne Sataloff, "Law Student," all of whom with others named below are graduates
of the law school that Dean Godfrey made and made his own.
2. 430 A.2d 1109 (Me. 1981).
3. Id. at 1111.
4. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 638 A.2d 720,722 (Me. 1994) (seeing a driver nursing
a can of beer for the better part of an hour in his vehicle before driving off does not
constitute articulable suspicion of operating under the influence; elements of offense
not discussed).
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
6. 414 A.2d 229 (Me. 1980). The state was represented by David M. Cox, District
Attorney, and Assistant District Attorneys Gary F. Thorne and Margaret J.
Kravchuk. Jay P. McCloskey represented one of two defendants.
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ture, door casings, mouldings, light switches and chessmen. '"7 Jus-
tice Godfrey wrote the opinion for the court in State v. Clark'
upholding a search of a pedestrian for weapons on the authority of
Terry v. Ohio9 and Adams v. Williams.'0 Justice Godfrey's opinion
for the court in State v. Darling" sustained a search of an automo-
bile for weapons based on the articulable-suspicion standard of
Terry v. Ohio correctly anticipating the Supreme Court's decision
five years later in Michigan v. Long. 2 In State v. Albert 3 the court
held that a defendant who had borrowed a car and returned it had
no standing to contest a search of the vehicle under a warrant three
weeks later. The court also rejected on standing grounds an odd-
ball claim that the state's using a particular method of analyzing a
breath sample for alcohol content in which the sample was con-
sumed in the process denied defendant the opportunity to verify the
results in violation of due process and equal protection. 4
A defendant's testimony that he had taken two "hits" of LSD six
or seven hours before being interrogated in police custody was not
enough to persuade Justice Godfrey that the defendant had been
unable to waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona 5 knowingly
and voluntarily.' 6 In State v. Theriault17 Justice Godfrey wrote for
the court that a defendant's confession (after having been properly
advised of Miranda rights) was not rendered involuntary by a police
officer's having prompted him with such helpful suggestions as "it
would make him feel better" to tell the truth and "people would
think more of him if he got it off his chest."'"
7. Id. at 234.
8. 365 A.2d 1031 (Me. 1976). The district attorney was assisted by Theodore H.
Kirchner, "Law Student," while the defendant was represented by Wallace S. Reed.
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
11. 393 A.2d 530 (Me. 1978). Thomas E. Delahanty, II, District Attorney, and
Linda Sibery Crawford, Assistant District Attorney, represented the state. Paul H.
Mills represented the defendant.
12. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
13. 426 A2d 1370 (Me. 1981). Bronson Platner, Assistant District Attorney, ar-
gued for the state.
14. State v. Sutherburg, 402 A.2d 1294 (Me. 1979). The court set aside defend-
ant's sentence because the superior court had based the fine on the cost to the
county of conducting a jury trial. The sentencing judge had stated, "A .29 blood test
is ordinarily a sufficiently high test that warrants a non-trial." ld at 1296. Joseph H.
Field, Assistant District Attorney, represented the state.
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. State v. Gordon, 387 A.2d 611 (Me. 1978).
17. 425 A.2d 986 (Me. 1981). Charles K. Leadbetter, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, represented the state. Franklin Steams represented the defendant.
18. Id. at 990.
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II. ELABORATING MIRANDA
Justice Godfrey was assigned to write a series of opinions for the
court on the predicate for activating the protective rules announced
by the Supreme Court in the great and leading decision of Miranda
v. Arizona. "Miranda warnings" were required to be given at the
outset whenever a person was subjected to custodial interrogation.
On what was meant by "custodial interrogation" the Court in Mi-
randa had planted a false clue. "By custodial interrogation," the
Court said, "we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement of-
ficers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way."19 In other
words in a rare logical lapse the Court had defined "custodial inter-
rogation" to mean interrogation both in custody and sometimes not
in custody.2 0 Twice before Justice Godfrey turned his hand to the
task had the Court applied Miranda to cases of official interrogation
not involving station-house questioning. In Mathis v. United States"
the Court held that a federal revenue agent's interviewing a state
prisoner was custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings
even though the questioning was part of a routine tax investigation
that might not lead to criminal charges and the questioning and cus-
todial authorities were not the same. In Orozco v. Texas'2 the Court
held that police officers' questioning a suspect who was under arrest
in his own bedroom likewise amounted to custodial interrogation
activating the requirement of Miranda warnings. In Beckwith v.
United States' the Court had refused to apply Miranda to a suspect
who had been questioned by revenue agents both where he was
staying and where he worked. Although the defendant-taxpayer
was the "focus" of a criminal investigation, the Court agreed with
both lower courts that there was no evidence that the defendant was
in custody.
In Justice Godfrey's first case, State v. McLain, 4 California police
officers acting on a tip had gone to defendant's home and, having
been admitted by another occupant, had seen antiques matching the
description of goods stolen from a summer home in Blue Hill,
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444 (footnote omitted). See id. at 477.
20. That logical flaw was not finally corrected until the Court decided Berkemer
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (custody means a deprivation of liberty that is the
functional equivalent of arrest) although the result there reached was a foregone
conclusion after the Supreme Court decided Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (valid consent to a search by a suspect who has been deprived of liberty
short of arrest does not require knowledge of right to refuse).
21. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
22. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
23. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
24. 367 A.2d 213 (Me. 1976). The state was represented by among others Sandra
Hylander Collier, "Student."
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Maine.'5 Without warning him of his Miranda rights they ques-
tioned the defendant on how he had come by the stolen goods. The
defendant told them a cock and bull story, which despite his excul-
patory lies nevertheless placed him in Maine at the time of the theft.
Unable to confirm defendant's alibi with Maine police, the officers
returned to defendant's home the next night and questioned him
again also without giving him a Miranda warning.' Over defend-
ant's objection one of the officers testified at trial to the defendant's
fabrications and admissions, and he was convicted and appealed.
The issue presented was whether defendant's statements were the
product of custodial interrogation. If so, they would have been
inadmissible for failure to give a Miranda warning.
Misled not by Miranda's false clue but by an accurate explanatory
dictum in Miranda that "[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning... or
other general questioning of citizens... is not affected by our hold-
ing,"27 a remark elevated above its rightful status by an earlier deci-
sion of the Law Court,2 Justice Godfrey drew a dichotomy between
"general investigation" on one hand and "custodial interrogation"
on the other and posed the question of whether the line between the
two had been crossed.29 His opinion notes that the defendant had
been interviewed in his own home at a reasonable hour in the pres-
ence of friends and had been free to move about his house and
states that "[a]ny suspicions aroused by the discovery of stolen prop-
erty in his home were apparently allayed by his convincing explana-
tion and cooperative manner" and thus credits an officer's testimony
that the defendant did not become a suspect until after the two con-
versations.30 The opinion states, "We conclude that at the two times
appellant spoke to the police, the police were still conducting a gen-
eral investigation and that appellant's statements were not made in
the course of a custodial interrogation.",31 The court reached the
right result. In attaching weight to whether the police suspected the
defendant when they questioned him, the court did not notice Beck-
with v. United States,32 decided eight months earlier, in which the
Supreme Court had held that a suspect's being the "focus" of a
criminal investigation when he was questioned was not evidence of
being in custody. To treat the two as functional or legal equivalents,
25. Id at 216.
26. l at 216, 219-20.
27. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 477.
28. State v. Inman, 350 A.2d 582, 597-99 (Me. 1976). Justice Godfrey's opinion
also cited a Second Circuit opinion, United States v. Hall. 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1969), in support of the proposition that "[w]hether police conduct amounts to a
significant deprivation of freedom depends on the many circumstances then ex-
isting." State v. McLain, 367 A.2d at 220.
29. State v. McLain, 367 A.2d at 220.
30. Id
31. Id
32. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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the Court said, "would cut this Court's holding in [Miranda] com-
pletely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale"33 (which was
to counteract compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation by giv-
ing an elaborate admonition of rights on a theory that knowledge is
power).
Four years later the same issue of custodial interrogation was
posed in State v. Preston.34 Police had executed a valid warrant to
search a trailer belonging to one defendant (Dale Preston) and had
seized stolen goods and had looked through a window of a cabin
belonging to the other defendant (Wallace Preston) and seen a mat-
tress matching the description of other stolen property. When they
returned to Dale Preston's trailer, Dale ran into the woods, and
Wallace met the officers outside. A state trooper "invited Wallace
into his police cruiser," where the two sat in the front seat while a
game warden sat in the back.35 The trooper testified that he told
Wallace that "'he was talking to me of his own volition, that he
could leave any time he wanted to. I didn't have any plans of mak-
ing any arrest.' ,36 Wallace admitted that he and Dale had stolen a
stove and two mattresses, and he went to his cabin and retrieved the
stolen mattresses. At about that time Dale came out of the woods.
The trooper "told Dale he would like to talk to him a few minutes,
that he had no intention of arresting him at that time, and that if he
chose not to talk, he did not have to."'37 Dale got into the cruiser
with the state trooper and the game warden, and he admitted the
crime. On those facts the superior court granted the defendants'
motions to suppress their statements and the two mattresses pro-
duced by Wallace as the product of improper interrogation. The
state appealed. Justice Godfrey writing the opinion for the court
posed the issue presented: "The only issue is whether defendants
were in custody within the meaning of Miranda. '38
By the time Preston reached the Law Court, the United States
Supreme Court had issued a major clarification of custodial interro-
gation in Oregon v. Mathiason39 on facts indistinguishable from
Preston. Instead of inviting the defendant to sit and talk in a police
car, a police officer had asked a burglary suspect to meet him at
police headquarters to discuss something, and when the defendant
arrived, the officer took him to an office and closed the door. Just as
the Maine officer had told the Preston boys that they could leave
and were not under arrest, the officer in Oregon v. Mathiason told
33. Id at 345.
34. 411 A.2d 402 (Me. 1980). The state was represented by among others Sandra
Hylander Collier, Assistant District Attorney.
35. Id. at 404.
36. Id
37. Id
38. Id. at 405.
39. 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam).
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the suspect that he was not under arrest. The officer told the de-
fendant that the police believed he had been involved in a burglary,
as the Prestons had been told that they were under suspicion of
theft, and the officer falsely stated that the defendant's fingerprints
had been found at the scene. After sitting and thinking for a few
minutes the defendant confessed. Then the officer advised the de-
fendant of his Miranda rights and took a taped confession. The of-
ficer said that he was not arresting defendant at that time and
allowed him to leave. The state supreme court held that the officer
had obtained the defendant's confession during interrogation in a
"coercive environment" without having given the requisite Miranda
warning. The Supreme Court reversed. Quoting Miranda the Court
said that Miranda warnings are required only when "a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way."4" Observing that the defendant had
come voluntarily to the station, where he was informed that he was
not under arrest, and that he had left without hindrance after a half-
hour interview, the Court said, "[T]here is no indication that the
questioning took place in a context where respondent's freedom to
depart was restricted in any way."41 Accepting as a fact of life that
"[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer wil
have coercive aspects to it,"42 the Court said, "But police officers
are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question."43
Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply be-
cause the questioning takes place in the station house, or be-
cause the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.
Miranda warnings are required only where there has been
such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him "in
custody."44
A recent clarifying decision by the United States Supreme Court on
a point of constitutional law presented in your case is a nice thing to
have. The question for the Law Court in Preston pretty clearly was
whether that case fell within the principle of Oregon v. Mathiason.
The Law Court's opinion noticed the Supreme Court's decision
but cited it only in a compare-Oregon v. Mathiason-with-Orozco v.
Texas citation for the proposition that all circumstances must be
considered in determining custody. The court held that the lower
court's finding of custody was supported by the evidence showing
that the police suspected the defendants of a crime and told them so
40. Id. at 494.
41. Id. at 495.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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and questioned them inside a police car.45 The court turned for au-
thority for giving decisive weight to the officers' focusing on the de-
fendants as suspects not to the contrary holding of Beckwith v.
United States but rather to the old Second Circuit opinion in United
States v. Hall.46 Without disputing the state's argument that "no
arrest was made or any physical restraint imposed" and acknowledg-
ing that the interrogating officer "informed each defendant that he
was free to leave and did not have to talk"47 the court reasoned that
by telling the defendants that they were suspects the police had "in-
creased the potential for creating the coercive atmosphere which
triggers the requirement of the Miranda warnings. "48 Similarly the
officers "increased the coercive nature of the interrogation by con-
ducting it in the police car instead of inside the trailer or outdoors.
S. ., Thus, the court said, the record supported the lower court's
finding "that the line between general investigatory questioning and
custodial interrogation was crossed . . . ."10 The court reached the
wrong result by applying a legal standard equivalent to the one re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Oregon v. Mathiason.
Then came State v. Thurlow5' in which a police officer, responding
to another officer's call for help on account of a burglary in progress
at a closed tavern, stopped his cruiser at the tavern entrance, where
defendant was standing, and, recognizing the defendant as someone
he had arrested two months earlier for auto theft, approached the
defendant "as low key as possible" and asked him what he was do-
ing there. The defendant gave a false exculpatory reply. The supe-
rior court denied defendant's motion to suppress on the ground that
no Miranda warning was necessary because "investigation had not
yet focused on Thurlow"52 when the officer asked him the question.
On appeal from his conviction of burglary defendant argued that the
lower court had applied an erroneous legal standard by denying the
motion to suppress on the basis of the officer's lack of "focus" on
the defendant. Oregon v. Mathiason implicitly and Beckwith v.
United States explicity supported defendant-appellant's position.
45. State v. Preston, 411 A.2d 402, 405-06 (Me. 1980).
46. 421 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1969). See supra note 28. The court cited Miranda for
the statement that one circumstance relevant to custody is whether questioning has
begun to focus on the interrogated person as a suspect, but the reference, Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966), does not support that proposition.
47. State v. Preston, 411 A.2d at 405.
48. Id. at 406.
49. Id. at 405.
50. Id. at 406.
51. 434 A.2d 1 (Me. 1981). The state was represented by District Attorney
Henry N. Berry, III, Deputy District Attorney Peter G. Ballou, and William Dar-
row, law student intern. The defense was represented by C. Alan Beagle of Glass-
man, Beagle & Ridge.
52. Id at 3.
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The Law Court would hear nothing of it.53 "Whether investigation
by the police has focused on the defendant.. . is one circumstance
to be weighed" in determining custody.-' "Though not a controlling
factor in establishing the existence of custody," the court said, "fo-
cus is at least relevant"' 5 citing State v. Preston, State v. Inman, and
"[a]ccord" Beckwith v. United States and, naturally, the Second Cir-
cuit opinion in United States v. Hall. Later the court made a point of
saying that "[s]pontaneous encounters with potential suspects where
preliminary questioning is necessary are bound to occur in the
course of on-the-scene investigations. But such encounters are not
perforce custodial"5 6 citing Oregon v. Mathiason, which was the op-
posite of such an encounter. As to the officer's testimony that he
was suspicious of the defendant, the court said: "That a person is a
suspect, though relevant to focus and thus to custody, does not con-
clusively establish custody" 7 citing Oregon v. Mathiason.
The court concluded by seemingly adopting the same "coercive
environment" standard that the Supreme Court had rejected in Ore-
gon v. Mathiason. The Law Court said that the police officer's con-
duct "had not become sufficiently aggressive or intimidating to
create the type of coercive, confining environment the notion of Mi-
randa custody connotes."5' s As to the officer's testimony that he
would have detained the defendant had he attempted to leave, that
testimony was "immaterial to our inquiry, limited as it is to assessing
the environment created by the police officer" just before defendant
spoke.59
Justice Godfrey partially redeemed himself and the court in State
v. Bleyl6° upholding a superior court's finding that a defendant who
had responded to a police officer's request to come to the police
station by saying that he would be glad to come and help in any way
he could was not in custody when he was thereafter interrogated at
53. Whether the superior court's error should have resulted in overturning the
conviction is another question because an officer's focusing on someone as a suspect
is a standard more lenient toward the defendant than the correct standard of cus-
tody. No serious argument could be made that an officer's approaching a suspect
"as low key as possible" and asking what he was doing there amounted to custody
except for the officer's testimony that he would have detained the defendant had he
attempted to leave.
54. State v. Thurlow, 434 A.2d at 3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 4 (citation omitted). The court then quoted statements from an inter-
mediate state court opinion that were actually unattributed (and slightly altered)
quotations from Oregon v. Mathiason. Id.
57. Id. at 5.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 5.
60. 435 A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981). The state was represented by Wayne S. Moss,
Charles IC Leadbetter, and Herbert Bunker, Assistant Attorneys General, and one
of three defendants was represented by Stephen Y. Hodsdon.
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the station. Curiously the court's analysis of custody was preceded
by a lengthy discussion sustaining the trial court's holding that de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated by his
station-house interview because he had not been seized. If he had
not been seized (even short of arrest), how could he possibly have
been in custody? Trial courts must examine all the facts, the court
said, "to determine whether the line between general investigation
and custodial interrogation has been crossed" citing State v. In-
man.6' "[W]hether police imposed restraint on him at the time of
questioning" was no more than one factor "bearing on a person's
deprivation of freedom." 62 Others included "focus" on the defend-
ant as a suspect, the place of questioning, and "a police-dominated
atmosphere., 63
III. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
State v. Bleyl" was also one of a series of opinions that Justice
Godfrey wrote for the court applying the principles announced in
Brown v. Illinois6 for determining when a defendant's statements,
although voluntarily given and preceded by proper Miranda warn-
ings, should nevertheless be suppressed as a product of an illegal
arrest. The first such case was State v. Turner,66 an appeal by the
state from an order granting a motion to suppress defendant's con-
fession made while under arrest without probable cause. (A com-
panion admitted committing a burglary and identified the defendant
as his accomplice. The defendant was a passenger in the automobile
containing the stolen goods. The superior court held that the com-
panion's statement was insufficient to establish probable cause be-
cause it was uncorroborated.) Without deciding whether the
arresting officer had probable cause, the Law Court held that the
defendant's own statement was admissible on the authority of
Brown v. Illinois. Defendant had been given a Miranda warning
and had spoken voluntarily. Although he made his statement while
he was under an arrest that the court assumed to be unlawful, he
had not been detained long or intensively interrogated. Hence
61. Id. at 1358.
62. Id.
63. Id The court's discussion cited State v. Preston, State v. Thurlow, and Beck-
with v. United States (the latter for the proposition that "focus" alone is not
equivalent to custody), of course included the obligatory citation to the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in United States v. Hall, and quoted the same statements quoted in
State v. Thurlow but this time correctly attributing them to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Oregon v. Mathiason.
64. 435 A.2d 1349 (Me. 1981).
65. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
66. 394 A.2d 798 (Me. 1978). The state was represented by David M. Cox, Dis-
trict Attorney, and Gary F. Thorne and Margaret J. Kravchuk, Assistant District
Attorneys. Whether or when the defendant was arrested is not really clear.
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"[there was no undue exploitation of the arrest."'67 The most im-
portant consideration for the court was that the arrest was neither a
purposeful nor flagrant violation of the Fourth Amendment. "We
are unable to draw any inference" that the officer, who believed he
was acting on reliable information, "thought the arrest of Trner to
be improper."6 "We do not interpret [the superior court's] finding
to mean that the arrest of Thrner was not made in good faith."69
Considering "the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule" the
court said, "We conclude that the defendant's confession was not
unconstitutionally tainted by his prior arrest."70 That holding, pre-
sumably all to avoid reviewing what looks like an obviously errone-
ous ruling on probable cause, comes perilously close to adopting a
good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule or
at least a good-faith-plus-Miranda-warning-and-waiver exception to
the rule.
State v. Bleyl presented startling facts. Two other defendants had
confessed (voluntarily and after Miranda warnings) while under
arrest pursuant to warrants supported by probable cause but issued
by a New Hampshire justice of the peace who had neither read the
supporting affidavit nor taken a sworn statement from the officer
who applied for the warrants.71 No matter. "Although Coyne and
Bleyl made their statements shortly after their arrests, the record
contains no evidence that officers exploited the arrests in obtaining
the statements. Perhaps most importantly, the record reveals that
the police conduct in effecting the arrests was in no way purpose-
fully or flagrantly illegal." T The police had probable cause to arrest
and believed in good faith that they had obtained valid warrants.
"Nothing in the conduct of the local New Hampshire officers or of
Maine State Police officers manifested the kind of willful or pur-
poseful misconduct that the exclusionary rule was fashioned to de-
ter."' Shades of United States v. Leon?74
67. Id at 800.
68. Id.
69. Id
70. Id.
71. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d at 1349, 1354, 1360-61. If, as the court states, the
police had probable cause to arrest, then why were arrest warrants necessary? The
court states in a footnote, "The State has conceded that Coyne's and Bleyl's arrests
cannot be justified as warrantless arrests, and we agree." Id at 1360 n.9. No author-
ity was given. The only conceivable basis for requiring warrants is Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Defendants were arrested in the home of one of them
where the other was an overnight guest. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d at 1361.
72. State v. Bleyl, 435 A.2d at 1361 (citing State v. Irner, 394 A.2d at 800).
73. Id The result would be correct under New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990)
(violation of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) does not require suppressing
evidence including confession obtained outside home).
74. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (refusing to require suppression of evidence obtained by
police officers in good faith reliance on invalid search warrant).
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The court drew the line in State v. LeGassey75 under the benefi-
cent influence of Taylor v. Alabama.76 Much about the case is un-
clear largely because of the manner in which the case was presented
to the Law Court. Proceeding on an assumption that defendant had
been unlawfully detained or arrested for lack of probable cause, the
court affirmed a district court order suppressing defendant's admis-
sion, although made voluntarily after a Miranda warning, and the
results of a breath test to which he had consented. The record
presented no evidence to suggest that the officer believed in good
faith that he had the authority to detain the defendant. Considering
the closeness in time between the seizure and obtaining the evi-
dence and the absence of any intervening circumstances, the court
held that the evidence was properly suppressed. The rule that
emerges from the cases is that statements made voluntarily after Mi-
randa warnings and other evidence yielded by consent will not be
suppressed despite the illegality of a seizure of the defendant if the
officers acted in (presumably objectively reasonable) good faith.
Two last opinions by Justice Godfrey on the constitutional law of
search and seizure are particularly noteworthy. One is Maine's
leading decision on return of property illegally seized, State v.
Sweatt.77 The other is State v. Nason78 the facts of which preclude
discussing it in mixed company. Rule 41(e) of the Maine Rules of
Criminal Procedure authorizes "a person aggrieved by an unlawful
seizure" to move in the superior court "for return of the property on
the ground that it was illegally seized." Motions under Rule 41(e)
for return of property assertedly unlawfully seized, having been vir-
tually eclipsed by motions to suppress, are relatively rare these
days.7 9 Rule 41(e) motions are atavisms of the old procedure from
75. 456 A.2d 366 (Me. 1983). Gary F. Thorne, Assistant District Attorney, repre-
sented the state, and Norman S. Heitmann, III, represented the defendant.
76. 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
77. 427 A.2d 940 (Me. 1981). The state was represented by Janet T. Mills, Dis-
trict Attorney, and the defendant was represented by Craig E. himer, who was as-
sisted by one of Justice Godfrey's former law-faculty colleagues.
78. 433 A.2d 424 (Me. 1981) (upholding against Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims a certain body-cavity search of a prisoner and subsequent seizure of contra-
band purportedly authorized by a warrant). Patricia Goodridge Worth, Assistant
District Attorney, represented the state. The problematical issue that cannot be dis-
cussed is the testimonial aspects of the act of production under the Fifth Amend-
ment. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Baltimore City Dep't of Social
Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
79. Only three times has the Law Court directly reviewed orders granting or de-
nying motions for return of property under Rule 41(e). See State v. Bevins, 446
A.2d 1119, 1119-20 (Me. 1982) (property no longer in possession or control of court,
police, or prosecutor cannot be ordered to be returned); State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d
940, 950-51 (Me. 1981) (property unlawfully seized that is neither contraband, stolen
property, nor evidence of a crime must be returned); State v. Cadigan, 249 A.2d 750,
760 (Me. 1969) (contraband, property that is illegal to possess, need not be returned
although unlawfully seized). See also State v. One Uzi Semi-Automatic 9mm Gun,
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which motions to suppress originated. Reaching all the way back to
Weeks v. United States"0 we find that petitions or motions for return
of seized property were the typical means of raising the issue of the
validity of searches and seizures. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Weeks that is commonly regarded as having announced the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule was actually that the trial court had
infringed the rights of the accused under the Fourth Amendment by
denying his petition for return of property seized without a warrant
and had erred thereafter in admitting the property in evidence."1
Not until Husty v. United States82 and Taylor v. United States, did
the Court adopt today's terminology of "motion to suppress"' and
say, "The evidence was obtained unlawfully and should have been
suppressed."'
No criminal prosecution or other proceeding was pending when
the movant in State v. Sweatt filed a motion for return and suppres-
sion of tourmaline gems seized pursuant to warrants from his home,
office, and bank vault and from a safe in his attorney's office and
tourmaline jewelry seized without a warrant from a retail store sell-
ing it on consignment. Holding that the warrants were not sup-
ported by probable cause to believe that the movant had stolen the
rocks and the warrantless seizure was unsupported by exigent cir-
cumstances, the superior court granted the motion (except for items
taken from the attorney's safe on grounds of standing), and both the
movant and the state appealed. Not batting an eye at the unusual
orphan-motion procedure, Justice Godfrey's opinion affirmed the
conclusion "that there was no showing of probable cause to believe
that any of the seized property had been illegally acquired,"' re-
versed the lower court's order insofar as it denied standing to con-
test the search of the attorney's safe, and ordered that all of the
gems and jewelry be returned and suppressed.87
589 A.2d 31, 33 n.1, 35 n.9 (Me. 1991) (contraband unlawfully seized need not be
returned even if not subject to forfeiture); Plumbago Mining Corp. v. Sweatt, 444
A.2d 361, 370-71 (Me. 1982) (on third-party claims to property unlawfully seized);
State v. McKenzie, 440 A.2d 1072, 1077 n2 (Me. 1982) (pretermitting question of
returning property illegally seized); State v. Smith, 381 A.2d 1117. 1123 (Me. 1978)
(in granting motion to suppress court may sua sponte order property returned).
80. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
81. Id. at 398.
82. 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
83. 286 U.S. 1 (1932).
84. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. at 701.
85. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. at 6.
86. State v. Sweatt, 427 A.2d at 951.
87. Id.
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IV. A PARTING THOUGHT
To me Justice Godfrey is more properly called Dean, for I was
and remain one of his students. I remember spending with my class-
mates a solid hour in trusts and estates on the single issue of
whether a power of appointment is an "interest" in property within
the Rule Against Perpetuities ("No interest is good unless . . .
[etc.]"). I remember his circling my commas in red and calling them
"false" and so being required for the first time in my life to justify
each one. No surprise will come to all who were similarly situated
to learn that the abiding characteristic of our hero's judicial opinions
is forthright honesty.
